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This paper investigates the presence of a network externality which might explain the persis-
tence of low schooling achievements among internal migrants. A simple analytical framework
is presented to show how an initial human capital disparity between migrants and non mi-
grants can translate into persistent skill inequality if origin shapes the composition of social
networks. We test empirically whether young migrantsschooling decisions are a¤ected by
the presence of covillagers at destination, using data on life-time histories of migration and
education choices from a rural region of Thailand. Di¤erent modelling approaches are used
to account for the self-selection of young migrants, for potential endogeneity of the network
size, and for unobserved heterogeneity in individual preferences. The size of the migrant
network is found to negatively a¤ect the propensity of young migrants to pursue schooling
while in the city. This nding suggests that policies seeking to minimising stratication in
enclaves might have a socially multiplied impact on schooling participation, and, ultimately,
a¤ect the socio-economic mobility of the rural born.
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1 Introduction
Human capital accumulation is a social activity, involving groups of people in a way that has
no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capitalRobert E. Lucas (1989)
"People in the city and people in the village arent the same. City people, Bangkok people,
you cant trust them, they only think of themselves. In the city people dont know each other.
Ive lived in this room for many months now and I still dont know the neighbors. In the village
I know everyone. We grow up together, were all relatives and friends together. I know where
they come from, their background. I can trust them." Daeng, a 20-year-old textile operative
quoted in Mills (1997)
Disparities in growth between urban and rural areas, as well as reduction in migration costs,
act as powerful pull factors augmenting the demographic pressures on overcrowded cities of
developing countries. It is tempting to assert that the access to more remunerative employment
opportunities in urban agglomerates increases the expected returns on education and therefore
acts as an incentive to invest in human capital for those planning to migrate. However, young
migrants take the decision to pursue schooling beyond a literacy level jointly with their family
and inuenced by the broader social network they belong to. It is increasingly recognized that
di¤erences in the composition and exclusion mechanisms of these networks a¤ect opportunity
costs of higher education.
Economic research on network e¤ects and welfare of the migrant population has produced
contrasting results. One strand of the literature emphasizes that the reliance of migrants on
origin-specic social capital can be associated with a lower rate of assimilation of destination-
specic skills. Among others, Borjas (1995) has shown that ethnic neighborhoods have detri-
mental e¤ects on the educational attainment of migrants in the US. A competing hypothesis
is that ethnic or origin-based concentration of migrants is a source of opportunities for gainful
interactions in the labor market, for example by disseminating information on job opportunities.
Banerjee (1983)s research on rural-urban migration in India documents extensively the impor-
tance of networks of covillagers for explaining migration ows, success of initial job search, and
duration of urban employment. With evidence in support of both positive and negative e¤ects,
it is unclear how segmentation along enclaves a¤ects economic performance of migrants.
This paper contributes to this literature by testing the hypothesis that migrant networks
might act as important externalities in the education process of young migrants, representing a
potential determinant of the observed low educational attainments. A simple analytical frame-
work, derived from recent contributions on group inequality (Bowles & Sethi (2006), Bowles
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et al. (2008)), shows how a family living in a disadvantaged community can optimally decide
to invest relatively less in schooling when network externalities are in place. In this framework,
belonging to the group with the lower average human capital is associated with an higher cost
of investment in education; inequality in educational attainment of individuals from di¤erent
groups is shown to persist across generations if segregation in enclaves is su¢ ciently high. In our
application of this framework to the issue of migrant assimilation, an important innovation is
the identication of two mechanisms through which segregation can endogenously emerge. The
rst draws on Benabou (1996)s research on stratication in the urban space, leading migrants
to concentrate in neighborhoods less favorable to human capital investments. The second argues
that migrant families care about being accepted among members of their own origin community,
and that they might be willing to reduce their investments in human capital to avoid the costs
of exclusion.
We test the relevance of this network externality using unique data from Thailand, the Nang
Rong Project database. This dataset provides direct individual and family information on both
migrants and stayers, through longitudinal surveys in the villages and migrant follow-ups in
the main urban destinations. It also includes rich retrospective information on migration and
education decisions. We can thus work with a panel data set of individual location decisions
and schooling outcomes, from multiple communities and to multiple destinations, over a long
period of time. Di¤erently from the majority of contributions in the migration literature, we
can take advantage of this balanced representation of migrants and stayers to control for the
fact that those choosing to migrate and to join the migrant network at destination are not a
random sample of the rural young population.
For the empirical analysis, we follow an approach close to Munshi (2003)s, who provides a
solid empirical illustration of the positive e¤ects networks can play for labor market outcomes
of mexican migrants. His instrumental variable analysis succeeds in controlling for the e¤ects of
correlated shocks among migrants from the same origins, using regional random rainfall variation
from the area of the migrants to identify the network e¤ects. Di¤erently from Munshi (2003),
we focus on the schooling decision of young internal migrants from the age of 13, as higher
education is believed to be an important proxy for social mobility of migrants within the urban
labor market1. The young migrants network is measured by the number of sampled individuals
in his village who are located at the destination at each point in time. Identication of network
e¤ects is based on the fact that each village has a di¤erent history of migration, so that the
rural young coming from di¤erent villages rely on di¤erently developed networks of contacts.
1An increasing number of studies shows the importance of education for migrant assimilation and long-term
earning prospects. Yamauchi (2003), examining wage dynamics of migrants in Bangkok, shows evidence of a
complementarity between upon-arrival human capital and labor market experience at destination. His results
imply that more-educated migrants have higher learning e¢ ciency and can perform tasks of greater complexity,
ultimately yielding higher wage growth in the destination market. In the context of international migration, some
important contributions have shown that the source of human capital matters, the one acquired at destination
being more rentable on the labor market (see Friedberg (2000) and Eckstein & Weiss (1998))
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The aggregation of networks at the tiny village level is another departure from Munshi2: data
evidence validates this measure as a good approximation of the true composition of the migrants
reference group3. We instrument network size by the exogenous source of variation associated
with random, ballot-based, assignment of young to the military service. The forced movement to
the cities of the rural young balloted to serve in the military tends in fact to be accompanied by
increased voluntary migration of these same young and others villagers in later years. Additional
instruments for network size are the exposure of the village to rain shocks, and a lagged measure
of the incidence of return migration to the village.
The estimates show that a larger network of co-villagers at destination lowers the probability
that a young migrant is enrolled in higher schooling. We interpret this result as an indication
that social interactions with the "origin" network matter in determining the migrant "long
term" prole, in terms of willingness to acquire destination-specic human capital and, possibly,
in terms of the speed at which he is able to converge to natives performances on the labor
market. The robustness of the results is conrmed when we shift to an alternative multinomial
mixed logit approach for the joint migration and education decision, which accounts explicitly
for individual heterogeneity.
These results suggest that network e¤ects can act as a driving mechanism of low-mobility
traps among migrants, at least in the context of this study. As a result, the important role
networks play in facilitating migration and easing life at destination might come at a cost,
slowing down the convergence of people of rural origin to the average level of skills of the
urban born. Considering the strength of the links migrants keep with their origin villages (by
remittances, return episodes and as role models), it cannot be excluded that this network e¤ect
on human capital might reinforce persistence in inequality between backward rural areas and
dynamic urban poles of developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a theoretical
framework giving important insights on the potential e¤ects of social networks on educational
investments of migrant minorities. Section 3 describes the data and the network measure used.
Section 4 illustrates the econometric analysis and summarizes the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling insights from the theory of segregation
To study the implications of segregation for di¤erential human capital accumulation and per-
sistent inequality consider the following setting, based on the theoretical studies of Bowles and
2We consider this as a signicant data advantage, making us more condent that we are actually capturing
social relations between migrants. On average, each village in our data has a population of less than 600 individ-
uals, much lower than that of a community in the mexican data used by Munshi (2003). Our network measure is
also specic to each urban destination, that have a geographical extension much lower than the one of US States
in Munshi (2003).
3Thai villages were historically fairly tightly bounded social communities and traditional village life was rela-
tively isolated, generating a common community culture and encouraging behavioral conformity (Godley (2001)).
Of course, this static picture is evolving now with the increasing migration ows to the cities.
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Sethi (2006), and Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008). Individuals belong to two groups, Natives (N)
and Migrants (M), and have a preference for association with individuals of their group, which
is dened as segregation. There is an imperfect mixing of migrants and natives. This diversity
in social network composition translates in di¤erent opportunity costs of human capital accu-
mulation, as an externality is in place linking each training achievement of a young with those
of the other agents to which he is tied. Inequality in the allocation of skills between migrants
and non migrants is shown to widen and persist in time if segregation is high enough. This
result is crucially linked to the assumption of a positive, exogenously given level of segregation.
Drawing on the work of Bénabou (1996) on the role of skill di¤erences in determining residential
choices in the urban space, and on the work of Austen-Smith & Fryer (2005), in which agents
care about social acceptance in their own group when taking decision on human capital accu-
mulation, we "endogenize" the networking process, giving us even stronger foundations to the
negative link between migrant networks and schooling enrollments observed in the data. This
provides the foundation for the empirics, which emphasizes the role of elective participation in
social networks, and tries to account for the endogenous development of these networks.
2.1 Basic setting
We here follow closely the development and notation in Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008). Consider
a scenario with overlapping generations and families composed by one parent and one child,
living in a city for two periods. In the rst period of life parents can decide to invest in the
training of the child, while no human capital accumulation occurs in the second period of life
when everyone works for a wage. Time is indexed by t; t = 0; 1:::T . Agents belong by birth
to one of two groups V = N;M , the natives of the city N and those of rural origin (migrants
and descendents of migrants) M . The proportion of N and M in the total urban population is
exogenously given respectively by n and 1   n. Agents are characterised by their skill (human
capital) level s, which can take two values, being equal to l if the individual stays unskilled and
equal to h if the individual acquires skills when young.
There is a complementarity between high and low skill labor in the process of production. The
total output of the city economy in period t is given by the production function q(ht; lt), where ht
and lt are the proportions of workers employed in high-skill and low-skill jobs, respectively.Let
st denote the proportion of skilled individuals at each period in the overall economy: this is
simply a weighted average of sNt and s
M




t + (1  n)sMt (1)
The production function q satises constant return to scale, diminishing marginal returns to
each factor and the conditions lims!0q1 = lims!1 q2 =1.
Competitive rms assign two levels of wages according to the skill of the worker (wh > wl):
the wage di¤erential (st) is positive and decreasing in s.
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Assume that in the rst period there is a higher proportion of skilled among adult natives
than among adult migrants (sM0 < s
N
0 ) : this assumption is not strong if one allows that skills
acquired at the rural village are not fully transferable at destination.
Each individuals social network is composed by a mix of individuals from ones origin group
and from the other group. Suppose, as in Bowles and Sethi (2006), that a proportion  of
each agents social a¢ liates is drawn from his own group of origin, while the remaining 1   
is randomly drawn from the overall city population. Denote by LV the mean level of human
capital in the social network of an individual belonging to either the native or migrant group.
This index of the human capital quality of ones social network depends on the levels of human
capital in each one of the two groups and on the extent of segregation ; as follows:
LVt = s
V
t + (1  )st (2)
It should be clear that in the absence of perfect integration ( > 0); LMt will be lower than
LNt as long as s
M
t is lower than s
N
t :
Parents fully internalize the preferences of their children with no discounting for the future,
so that training is undertaken if the benet for the child outweighs the cost for the parent. The
cost of training a young in any generation is given by the function c(at+1; Lt); strictly decreasing
in both the arguments a, child ability, and L, social networks quality. The distribution of ability
is given by the function G(a), with support [0;1), assumed to be the same across groups. The
benet of training is simply the wage di¤erential (st+1); which is the same across group, i.e.
no explicit labor market discrimination is in place.
2.2 Training decisions and persistence in inequality of skills
A threshold level of ability ea can be dened for each of two groups in V = N;M , so that only
the young of each group who have ability above this threshold are trained. This threshold level,eat+1; is implicitly dened by the value of ability satisfying
c(eat+1; LVt ) = (st+1) (3)
The following dynamics of human capital accumulation apply to each group:
sVt+1 = 1 G(eat+1((st+1); LVt )) (4)
simply meaning that only those young having ability greater than eat+1((st+1); LVt ) become
skilled workers in period t+ 1.
It is clear that increased segregation, by a¤ecting the quality of the social network LVt ; raises
the costs of human capital accumulation for the disadvantaged group, the internal migrants,
while lowering these costs for the natives.We now aim to show that, given a positive level of
segregation and the spillovers in human capital accumulation described above, optimal training
decisions of the native and the migrant group can be persistently di¤erent over time.
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Dene a competitive equilibrium as a sequence of skill allocations across groups f(sNt ; sMt )g1t=1
satisfying equations (1-4). The main result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Bowles et al.(2008)). Given any initial allocation (sN0 ; s
M
0 ) 2 [0; 1]2; a unique
equilibrium path f(sNt ; sMt )g1t=1 exists. Along this equilibrium path, if sM0  sN0 ; then sMt  sNt
for all t.
The intuition is that an initial situation of skill disadvantage of one group can not be reversed
along the equilibrium path, which is unique given an initial state (sN0 ; s
M
0 ). Bowles, Loury and
Sethi (2008)s formal proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium path and of persistence of
inequality is reproduced in the appendix. The appendix also provides an extensive treatment
of steady state behaviour of the model, a steady state being dened as an equilibrium in which
sVt = s
V
0 ; 8 t  1: The most interesting result concerns the instability of the unique symmetric
steady state - symmetric meaning that the additional condition sNt = s
M
t is satised - if the
segregation level  and the size of the interpersonal spillover are su¢ ciently high. This indicates
that convergence in skill levels among groups is not achievable even in the very long run, group
inequality persisting asymptotically.
2.3 Extensions accounting for determinants of segregation and network ex-
ternalities
The model identies conditions under which the combined e¤ect of network spillovers in the
cost of acquiring human capital and an origin bias in the composition of social networks can be
su¢ cient for internal migrants to be locked in a condition of low education achievements. In fact,
persistent group inequality can arise even in the absence of discrimination in the labor market,
and with equality of opportunity, that would hold if liquidity constraint for education are not
binding. This conclusion rules out one-shot redistributive policies as e¤ective instruments for
equalization. However, the scenario for policy becomes less somber if one is willing to get rid
of the assumption of a level of segregation  exogenously given and xed. Below, we provide
intuitions on two possible extensions of the model that endogenize , thereby increasing the
scope for policy interventions.
2.3.1 Social segregation and residential enclaving
One potential determinant of origin-biased social networking is the residential segmentation of
groups in city space. Think of the utility maximization problem faced by the adult as involving
also a location decision among two di¤erent neighborhoods, each parent trading o¤ the benet of
a better environment for his childs learning with the cost of higher rents. Equilibrium in the city
space is an allocation of households across neighbourhoods and rents such that no household
prefers a neighborhood di¤erent from its own. Bénabou (1996) proves that this equilibrium
will result in location stratication (those from one specic community preferring to locate in
one specic neighborhood), if the rich in human capital are able to bid more than the poor
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for living in the community with a higher endowment of human capital. Formally, Bénabous
sorting condition says that the marginal rate of substitution between the network quality and the
rent price increases with the parent level of education. When this sorting condition holds, any
divergence from the symmetric initial allocation of skill, sN0 = s
M
0 ; sets in motion a cumulative
process with skilled (higher income) people outbidding unskilled (lower income) people for the
privilege of locating close to other skilled (higher income) people. This process ends when at
least one neighborhood is completely homogeneous. At least three distinct determinants of
segregation can be identied by extending the model so as to account for spatial segmentation
à la Bénabou: a) complementarities between family human capital and community quality; b)
imperfections in capital markets resulting in the poor having a relatively higher opportunity
cost of borrowing; c) di¤erences in family life time resources4. Segregation in the city space
is a variable that can be a¤ected by policy: di¤erentiated taxes and subsidies can be e¤ective
in reallocating families across communities (Bénabou, 1996), and urban regeneration programs
can raise the attractiveness of neighborhoods where there is an historically higher concentration
of migrants5.
2.3.2 A "social signalling" e¤ect?
As spatial and social proximity are likely to be correlated, the allocation of individuals in strat-
ied neighborhoods can alone generate segmentation. Other mechanisms can explain why a
migrant can rationally prefer to maintain segregated social relations. We have in mind a sce-
nario in which the young derive utility from being part of his origin group and admission to
the group is selective. It seems reasonable to assume that migrants can diverge in the value
they assign to group participation, and that the migrant community might preserve its cohesion
by excluding families signalling little interest in participation by "deviant" behaviours. One
of these behaviours can be an investment in the schooling progression of the young which is
believed excessive by the group6.
Austen-Smith and Fryers (2005) develop a two-audience signalling model in order to explain
4Complementarity here simply means that families with higher human capital are more sensitive to neighbor-
hood quality than those with lower levels of human wealth.We refer to Bénabou (1996) for a detailed explanation
of these determinants of the segregation process. The original model of Bénabou allows for another determinant of
stratication, the level of decentralised expenditures in education nanced through taxes on the local population.
Basically, familiar and public inputs determine together the neighborhood-specic, per-student budget. Obvious
complementarities between parental human capital and local public expenditures on education supply are enough
to make the integrated equilibrium unstable (Bénabou, 1996).
5This issue is acknowledged by policy makers. The housing projects of the National Housing Authority (NHA)
and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) have engaged in ensuring some mix of housing at all price
range in each area. In addition, the Bangkok Plan addresses existing spatial disparities in the location of jobs and
housing, and encourages balanced jobs and housing growth in each of the city planning units (see Tapananont
(2004)).
6Various motives can explain why the migrant community can interpret higher schooling as a signal of low social
attachment. One reason is that the school enrollment of young already able for work can make a migrant family
temporarily unable to meet some social obligations, like sending to the village a minimal amount of remittances.
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the phenomenon of acting white, according to which young blacks in the US make a low
e¤ort in school as they are exposed to peer pressure condamning behaviors perceived to be
characteristic of whites. As in their model, a network e¤ect on training attainments can emerge
in our framework if the market and the social network value di¤erently an educational investment
of a young migrant. Add then the assumption that each individual migrants type is dened by
a pair,  = (; ), where  is intrinsic ability as above and  is the individuals social type (his
innate compatibility with his own community) which takes two values, high or low, and is only
privately observed7. Individuals have an interest in being accepted members of their community:
assume, for simplicity, that utility of time not spent acquiring education is augmented by a
factor () if one is accepted by his origin community. The migrant network, being imperfectly
informed about the individuals attachment to his origin community (if the individual social type
is high or low), can interpret an investment in destination specic human capital as a signal of
divergence and sanction it with exclusion from community life8. In the framework above, no
change occurs for the native group. However, for the migrant group, the rate of preference for
origin-biased networking  is now di¤erent from zero only for an endogenously dened subset
of individuals for whom the utility value of group participation outweighs the costs in terms of
wage income foregone. The threshold ability level ea; needed by these individuals to be trained,
increases with respect to the scenario with no need for social signalling. When the social type
is private knowledge then, conicting incentives to invest in destination specic human capital
and to signal loyalty to the group can be a channel through which historical group di¤erences
in human capital levels spill over into next generations investment behaviour.
Anything altering the trade-o¤ between income gains and value of group participation will
a¤ect the incidence of the network externality. For example, a productivity shift raising the
wages perceived by the migrants on the market would raise the opportunity costs of community
participation and lower the proportion of those willing to sacrice education for group accep-
tance. In the other direction, access to a larger community at destination can be expected to
increase the value of group participation, and thus the relevance of the externality on individual
schooling decisions.
7 In another class of models, incomplete information plays a role in education decisions via information costs.
In this case it can be rational to use the action of others as a signal instead of acquiring own information (see
Streufert (2000)).
8The group is assumed to have interest only on individuals whose social type is high, having no direct concerns
with such typeseducational levels. In Austen Smith and Fryers (2005) model, this is formalized by assuming
a xed, non negative, payo¤ for the group from rejecting any individual. This anthropomorphization of the
community group is consistent with other studies on social networking and under-development traps. Ho¤ & Sen
(2005) show that control mechanisms at disposal of the peer network can generate a poverty trap when economic
opportunities outside the origin community widen. An interesting study by Munshi & Rosenzweig (2003), with
survey data from Bombay, shows tha networks of lower caste male channel boys into local language schools leading
to traditional occupations, despite the substantial rise of returns to nontraditional occupations.
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3 Nang Rong data and network measures
The model above predicts a direct relation between the weight of people from ones origin group
in the social network and individual human capital achievements. A higher network size increases
the likelihood of interactions with people from ones origin community and it is thus expected
to be positively correlated with the segregation index : If a "social signalling" e¤ect exists, it
is likely to reinforce the externality in the cost of education, as social contacts will matter more
as determinants of similar behaviours within a group. We test the empirical relevance of this
network e¤ect for education decisions of young migrants using data on rural-urban migration
from Thailand. The Thai economy experienced a rapid development process in the period under
study, with an average growth rate of real GNP per capita of 5.7% per year between 1976 and
1996. However, there are concerns over the growing rural-urban divide in the same period, as
the income Gini coe¢ cient passed from 0.436 in 1976 to 0.515 in 1996, a level even higher than
the average one for Latin America and the Caribbean in the same year (Jeong (n.d.)).
The data come from a collection of research surveys of social, economic and environmental
change in the district of Nang Rong, historically one of the least-developed parts of Thailand.
The Nang Rong project dataset consists of three waves of data collection - for the years 1984,
1994, 2000. A migrant follow-up survey was added to track a sample of migrants who had
gone to one of the four following urban destinations: (1) metropolitan Bangkok, (2) the Eastern
Seaboard, a highly dynamic area comprising the two urban centers of Rayong and Chonbury,
(3) Korat, an important regional pole, and (4) Buriram, the provincial capital. The 2000 round
builds on the previous data collection e¤orts incorporating a geo-spatial component in addition
to the community, household and migrant follow-up surveys. Moreover, the 1994 and 2000
surveys undertook the innovative task to identify both social and kinship networks among the
residents, households and villages of Nang Rong. These ties are measured directly through
kinship, labor exchanges, and agricultural equipment exchanges.
In the estimations, we mainly exploit the life history sections of the 2000 data, collected on
the sample of individuals who are resident in Nang Rong at the time of the survey, and on the
sample of those residing in one of the major urban destination at that time. Life history, or
retrospective, data provide long-term information on migration and schooling choices, yielding
an unbalanced panel with a minimum of one observation for those aged 13-year-old in 2000,
to a maximum of 13 observations for those aged 25-year-old or older in 2000. The analysis
thus extends to multiple cohorts of individuals, and cover a period of more than 30 years. As
mentioned in the introduction, the most salient aspect of these data comes from the merging of
information on migrants and non migrants, which provides a picture of the rural community not
bounded by the rural district and thus closer to its true, geographically mobile, conguration.
Previous empirical research on migration has often su¤ered from a deep selection problem,
limiting the observation to those who are migrants at a given point in time. The fact that these
migrants are not a random sample of the origin population bias inference, selectivity occurring
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along many and mostly unobserved characteristics9. Other research on migration and source
communities has asked origin families to provide information on migrated members: there are
limits to the level of detail and to the quality of this indirect information. Of course, quality is an
issue also for retrospective data. There are reasons to suspect recall bias especially concerning
individuals who are older at the time of the 2000 survey, and thus have to reconstruct how
they behave in a distant past. However, Nang Rong surveys provide an opportunity to examine
data quality because they contain repeated retrospective histories undertaken in two points in
time, in 1994 and in 2000; a simple check of the matching of information provided by a subset
of individuals present in both survey conrm that quality is quite high10. Moreover, there is
evidence that events that are highly salient to the respondent, like schooling and migration
decisions, are better recalled (Beckett et al. (1999))11.
Network size (Net in the equations which follow) is dened by counting, for each young in-
dividual and each year, the number of co-villagers present at destination the year before12. Ex-
cluded from the count are migration episodes due to serving in the military service or as a monk.
The network measure is thus time varying, and specic to each couple of village-destination. As
already said, we assume that the village is the most relevant agora shaping social interactions
outside the family, ruling out the progressive integration among villages through trade, sharing
of equipment, and, most relevantly, seasonal mobility of laborers. We also exclude the migrated
members of the family from the count of the network size assigned to each individual-year, as
we are mainly interested in testing the e¤ect of acquiantances and transitory social relations.
INSERT TABLE 2 "Descriptive Statistics" HERE
In table 2, descriptive statistics are provided on adults residing in Nang Rong (column 1),
all the migrants (column 2), and disaggregated by destination. A quick overview suggests some
interesting patterns. There is no big di¤erence in internal migration behaviour of women and
men: the only destination where male migrants are predominant is Khorat. The average level of
education of parents is slightly higher for migrants than for non migrants, as well as the migrants
mean educational attainment. The average size of the migrant stock tends to be considerably
higher, as expected, in traditional destinations, such as Bangkok and the provincial capital
9Moreover, identifying the migrant population as the people absent from the village at the time of the survey
is problematic, as it puts no weight on the important issue of duration of migration, treating seasonal workers
as long-term movers. Using long retrospective data, we are able to approximate better the true investment in
migration of families and villages, reconstructing the full history of temporary and lasting movements to the city
and of returns.
10Comparing life histories data on the whole sample from the 1994 and 2000 survey, we obtain a positive match
of answers on migration histories (whether one spent most of the time outside Nang Rong in a given year) around
86% of the times. In our nal sample the percentage of positive matches is higher given that the average age is
lower (we keep information only on individuals for whom we have data on the previous generation).
11The authors assess the presence of recall bias in the Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS), nding that the
quality of the long retrospective histories in the MFLS is quite high, across a range of topics.
12We chose to use a count with a one year lag for two reasons: the decision of whether to migrate is probably
taken with some months in advance the actual departure; moreover, with a lagged value of the network size, we
should partially reduce the simultaneity problem, according to which unobserved shock a¤ect both the network
and the individual choices to migrate or to study.
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of Buriram, with respect to new emerging poles, such as cities in the Eastern Seaboard. At
their rst migration, movers rely on an extensive support from their communities, ranging from
hospitality (three out of four go and live with others they know), to help for nding a job or
for setting an enterpreneurial activity (61% received this kind of help). Migrants are also highly
successful in nding a job at destination within one month from their arrival, and they rather
move with friends or family. The last variables in the table give an interesting snapshot of the
extent of origin bias in social interactions. The whole pool of migrants reveal that, at the timing
of their rst move, around 62% of their neighbours - people living between 100 meters where they
lived - came from the region of Isan, where Nang Rong is located. This percentage lowers only to
60% when migrants are asked about their location at the year of the survey, 2000. Considering
that between the year of the rst move and the year 2000 there is an average interval of 11 years,
this seems to indicate that residential mixing does not occur in our sample. Statistics on the
origin of friends at destination, at the bottom of the table, give similar indications.
A legitimate concern is that our specic measure of network size at the village level might
not capture well e¤ective social network use by the migrants. In table 3, we undertake a simple
experiment to validate our network measure. Using the 2000 sample of migrants, we inspect
whether a positive correlation exists between network size and the preference for members of
ones own origin network as sources of help. Migrants are asked to identify the person outside
their family to which they would ask in the hypothetical situation of money problems. We run
a regression linking the probability that this person is someone from the origin village of the
migrant to the village-destination specic network size in 1999 and a set of controls. The highly
statistically signicant coe¢ cient associated with network size gives further indications that the
village of origin matters for migrantssocial relations. Moreover, variations in size of origin based
networks seem to be associated with variations in the importance of this informal institution for
internal migrants.
INSERT TABLE 3 "Validating the network measure" HERE
Table 4 diplays a transition matrix including data from the sample used in all the estimations,
including all the young individuals whose mobility and study choices are observed when they
had an age between 13 and 25. It shows the number of cases - a case corrisponding to the
individual-year pair- in which we observe a transition along one of the four following states: stay
in Nang Rong and work, stay in Nang Rong and study, having migrated to an urban destination
and work, having migrated and study. It can be seen that the sample has a fairly balanced
representation of migrants and non migrants. Simply spotting the number of unchanged states
on the diagonal of the matrix, one can see that there is a relatively higher number of cases of
individuals studying as residents at Nang Rong than as migrants, suggesting the possibility of
a schooling dispersion associated to migration.
INSERT TABLE 4 "Transition matrix for the joint schooling mobility choice" HERE
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4 Econometric models and results
The econometric identication of causal e¤ects of networks on education outcomes poses complex
problems. As emphasized by Manski (1993), the fundamental problem with the research on social
interactions is the necessity to control for correlated unobserved e¤ects within the community.
The empirical literature has followed di¤erent avenues for tackling confounding factors associated
with omitted common variables, simultaneity or reverse causality and selection or sorting.
Here we present three modelling approaches aimed to tackle the challenges of sample selec-
tion into migration, endogeneity of changes in network characteristics, and omitted variable bias
due to unobserved individual preferences for migration and schooling. The rst method corrects
selection bias by modelling, as a rst stage, the endogenous choice of moving to the city. The
second method tackles the potential endogeneity of network size in the young school enrollment
by instrumenting networks through the exogenous variations in the number of twenty years old
males balloted to serve in the military service and two additional instruments. As will become
clear, these two approaches, based on standard non-linear binary choice models, are complemen-
tary. The third approach proposes a multinomial formulation of the problem, which explicitly
controls for selection in migration status and unobserved heterogeneity. This third approach
yields results broadly consistent with those obtained using the binary choice formulation.
4.1 Estimation of network e¤ects corrected for migrant selection
We are interested in the education decision of the young once he has reached an urban destina-
tion13. The critical assumption for identication of migrant network e¤ects on this decision is
that the ow of young moving from rural to urban areas is sorted into groups according to their
village of origin. This sorting is however far from being a random assignment from the whole
pool of rural young. The availability of data on migrants and non migrants allows to model
explicitly the choice of migration as a pre-requisite for participation in group interactions. By
controlling for the non randomness of the migration choice, we correct sample selection and we
also aim to reduce the bias associated with non-random sorting into migrant networks, in essence
leading to a simultaneous selection of migration destination and associated networks. Because
of the dichotomy of the enrollment variable, treating the data as a pooled cross section, I follow
here Van de Ven & Van Praag (1981), whose probit sample selection model is an extension of
the Heckman (1979)s selection model for dichotomous outcome variables.
The binary enrollment equation for a young migrant i can be expressed in latent terms as
follows:
Ei = 
0Xi + 0Neti + "i1 (5)
13Note that the migrating and schooling decisions need not to be sequential, with the education decision being
taken after the residential one, as we can think of a young that chooses to migrate in order to pursue his higher
studies in city schools.
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Ei can be interpreted as a latent variable, expressing the expected utility gain from en-
rollment in school. In the notation above, 0 is the main coe¢ cient of interest, expressing the
impact on schooling enrollment of variation in Netij the size of the network of co-villagers, not
members of the origin family, present at destination the year before the education decision is
taken (NETWORK SIZE );  is a K1 vector of parameters to be estimated and Xi is a K1
vector of time varying and constant exogenous variables, at the individual, family and village
level: the schooling enrollment model controls for the gender of the young (MALE), his age in
2000 (AGE IN 2000), the number of younger siblings (SIBLING), the average education of the
parents (PARENTAL EDUCATION), origin family wealth (ASSET SCORE), the availability of
an high school at the origin village (SCHOOL), whether more than a language is spoken at home
(LANGUAGE), age dummies, origin village and city destination xed e¤ects, time controls and
a constant term. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed: "1i  N(0; 2):
Assume a reservation destination exists for each individual. This latent variable, expressing
the expected utility gain from migrating, can be expressed as:
Mi = 
0Ri + "i2 (6)
the vector Ri includes the control variables in Xi; the total number of migrants from a
village with one year lag (TOTAL NETWORK), a constant term and the following variables
selected as exclusion restrictions: the distance of the origin village from the main road to Nang
Rong (ROAD LENGHT), a measure of family migration experience (FAMILY MIGRATION),
and a family level measure of exposure to rain shocks at the origin (RAIN). Table 1 denes
how these variables have been constructed: however, a brief explanation can be useful here to
clarify the identication strategy. The distance of the village from the main road is expected
to be negatively correlated with habitants capacity to leave. Information and moving cost
of migration are expected to decrease with family previous migration experience. As shown in
other studies of migration from rural areas in developing countries14, scarce rains represent a
serious shock to agricultural production - the culture of rice in this context - which can induce
further migration. Given that there is only one meteo station collecting rain data for the whole
Nang Rong region, the exposure index has been built by interacting the average yearly volume
of rain in the district with the time investment of family members in agricultural activities15.
The error term in this selection equation is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution,
"i2t  N(0; 1)
The population regression function in (5), for the subsample of migrants, can be stated as:
E(Ei j Xi) = 0Xi + E("i1 j Xi; Neti;Mi  0): (7)
14The possibility of instrumenting migrant network size through rain shock has been rst noted by Munshi
(2003). The instrument used here has been inspired by the one applied to Nang Rong data by Swee (2007), who
introduces village-level variation by interacting rain volume with an estimated proportion of rice net producers.
15Rain data come from the Thailand Meteorological O¢ ce, and cover all years starting 1970. The time in-
vestment in agriculture is computed by counting, for all adult family members, the number of years they spent
working as peasants, starting from the age of 13, and dividing this number by their age minus 13.
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the parametric assumption of the model is the bivariate standard normal distribution of "i1
and "i2 , with correlation coe¢ cient : With this assumption, the error term in the outcome
equation has the following conditional distribution:




; and ; are respectively the standard normal density and cumulative
distribution.
As shown by Heckman (1979), the inverse Mills ratio term  is a control function that we
need to add to the outcome equation (5), in order to estimate consistenty the parameters  :
Ei = 
0Xi + 0Neti + i + "i1 (8)
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 and  can be consistently estimated using the Heckman two step procedure, or by a full
maximum likelihood approach.16
Given we are using pooled data with t observations for each individual, we need to cor-
rect standard errors for the likely intro group (individual) correlation17. This can be easily
implemented through the cluster variance estimator (see STATA (2007)).
INSERT TABLE 5 "School enrolment model with selection into migration" HERE
Results are displayed in table 5. The model is estimated on repeated annual observations
for 1860 young individuals between 13 and 25 years old, yielding an unbalanced panel of 12438
cases (one case corrisponding to the pair individual-year): of this total sample, 5624 observations
refer to young resident in one of the ve urban destinations. The main variable of interest, the
origin village migrant network size, has a statistically signicant negative impact on enrollment
(column 1); this negative impact is conrmed when we control for origin village xed e¤ects
(column 2). The magnitude of this impact is however small. Considering the specication with
village xed e¤ects, the probability of enrollment decreases of 1.3% with one standard deviation
change (3.3 in this sample) change in the network size.
As can be seen, there is no evidence of gender e¤ects either on the propensity to pursue higher
schooling or to migrate when young. Having educated parents raises the odds of being enrolled
16 I opt for the second one estimating the model through the heckprob command in STATA. See the STATA
reference manual (2007) for details on the command.
17The pooled probit estimator which considers the repeated observations for each individual as a large cross
section is consistent, but ine¢ cient. Higher e¢ ciency can be achieved by a random e¤ect probit estimator, but we
need to be willing to assume that the individual random parameter is uncorrelated with the observed covariates
(seeGreene (2003)).
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in school after the age of 13, while having no apparent e¤ect on the probability of migrating
internally. Having an higher number of younger brothers and sisters does not a¤ect schooling:
educational choice does not seem to depend, in this context, on competition for scarse resources
among siblings, as we would expect in a context where schooling costs are high relatively to
household income and credit constraints exist. Coming from a larger family seems to positively
a¤ect the willingness to migrate. Speaking more than one language at home has no signicant
e¤ects on schooling, while it is positively correlated with migration propensity: no univocal
causal relation can be established here, since the fact of speaking more than one language at
home can be associated with a family history of migration or interethnic marriages. In order
to control for family wealth while reducing evident endogeneity concerns, I build a principal
component measure of family long term income, condensing information on twelve productive
and non productive assets: this wealth measure has a signicant, positive explanatory power on
the odds of enrollment, while being negatively associated with migration. With respect to those
migrating to Bangkok, enrollment rates are higher for young who moved to Buriram (the regional
capital), or to Khorat, while are sensibly lower for those choosing to migrate to the Eastern
Seabord. As for the variables excluded for identication reasons, we observe that the overall
migration investment of the village (obtained by counting together migrants from the village
present in all the destinations with one year lag) is an highly relevant predictor of individual
migration. The cumulated number of years of working experience outside Nang Rong of family
members not in the sample (who are 40 years old or older), is another important explanatory
factor of young migration. Rain shocks act as an important push factor for individual migration
from a region where the colture of rice is still the main economic activity18. Villages with more
di¢ cult access to the Nang Rong town (as measured by distance to the major highway) tend to
have a lower participation in migration.
4.2 Instrumental variable estimation of network e¤ects
Instrumental variable estimation (IVE) is a powerful tool for dealing with three variations of the
same statistical problem: measurement error, simultaneity bias and omitted variable bias. Es-
sentially, all the three problems challenge the consistency of the model, pointing to the possibility
that the network size regressor can be correlated with unobserved determinants of enrollment
choice. Measurement error is an issue, since we dispose of an imperfect proxy of the true size of
the network from the origin community: given that villages are not isolated one from the other,
and that solidarity or mutual recognition can link individuals at an higher level than the vil-
lage19, it is possible that our measure is downwardly biased. Simultaneity bias can be a further
18This has been shown convincingly for Nang Rong data by Swee (2007), who build a measure of exposure to
rain shock by interacting rain intensity with a estimated probability of being a net rice producer.
19Speaking the same dialect, or coming from the same geographical region (Buriram), might represent weaker
ties among individuals, who can perceive themselves in the city as part of the same community even if coming
from di¤erent villages. Given the data I dispose of, and the tradition of strong solidarity and identity traditionally
16
threat to the consistency of network e¤ect estimation. The choice of youngster to be enrolled
in school can be internalized by the community, which might then transfer information on job
opportunities in the city to those who are still in the village; by this mechanism network size
might not only cause but also be inuenced by schooling behaviour. Finally, omitted variable
bias is probably the greatest source of concern, since we are not able to control for the full set
of unobserved factors a¤ecting both movements from rural areas to the cities and the human
capital accumulation of individuals who are part of this ow. The proposed instruments used
in order to correct for the possible correlation between the network size regressor and the error
term in the schooling equation are: 1) the village proportion of young males (at the ages of
20-21) who are balloted to serve in the military outside Nang Rong (MILITARY); 2) the expo-
sure of the village to rain shocks (RAIN VOLUME); 3) the incidence of return migration to the
village (RETURN). For what concerns the rst instrument, recruitment for the military service
in Thailand was by ballot until 1998, as the number of liable conscripts was far higher than the
number needed by the armed forces20. Call-up took place once a year and each district was given
a quota of the number of recruits needed by the armed forces. Liable males had to participate at
the ballot and those who drew a red ticket had to perform military service, leaving the village of
birth for up to two years. The random departures of the young imposed by the ballot system are
likely to represent an external variation of information on living and working opportunities out-
side Nang Rong. A simple inspection of the data suggests that there is a signicant correlation
between the stock of migrants in a given year and the number of young balloted for the military
the year before: migrant networks can be alimented directly by those young who choose not to
go back to the village when the coscription period has expired, or indirectly by the information
provided by conscripted movers to those considering the possibility to migrate (see gure 1).
As well known, instrumental variables need to satisfy not only the requirement of relevance but
also the one of instrumental exogeneity: restricting the relevant sample to individuals who are
19 years old or younger, we can believe that the randomized village-level participation of the
young in the military has no independent e¤ects on schooling choice of the young not liable for
serving in the army.
For what concerns rainfall shocks, as already said there is only one weather station in Nang
Rong, so we only dispose of rainfall variation over time, not villages: the village level measure
is built by interacting the level of rainfall with the village-level average time investment in
agriculture. The exogeneity of this second instrument can be reasonably assumed if we think
that shocks at the origin village have no other impact on schooling choices of young migrants
existing in Thailand among people from the same village, I choose not to depart from the assumption that the
village is the relevant bound for dening network size.
20Conscription was introduced in Thailand shortly after the First World War. In the 80s and 90s the re-
cruitment system increasingly became subject to public debate. Obviously the system was likely to lead
to favoritism on the hands of inuential or rich people. I expect this favoritism to be less pronounced
within the less developed rural areas of Nang Rong, and thus that young villagers had to face more or
less the same risk of being recruited for the military. See the military recruitment dataset at: http://leav-
www.army.mil/fmso/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf
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apart from altering the size of their relevant network21.
The last instrument is a count of episodes of return from each destination to the origin
village: the relevance of this instrument is straightforward, as substantial episodes of return
are observable in the dataset once the village starts to have a relevant migration history. I use
a two-year lagged value of this return variable to reduce the threat to validity represented by
unobserved factors or shocks likely to a¤ect both village level return behaviour and individual
schooling decisions.
The system of equation to be estimated can be expressed as:
Ei = I(
0Wi + ei > 0) (10)
Neti = 
0Zi + ui (11)
where Wi = (Xi;dNeti); with Xi being the usual set of controls and dNeti being the tted
values from the network instrumented equation (11), dNeti = b0Zi.
The instruments in the vector Zi are expected to satisfy the requirements of exogeneity and
relevance.
The log likelihood for observation i is:









The model is estimated using the IVProbit procedure in Stata which implements Amemiyas
generalized least square estimator (Amemiya (1978); Newey (1987)), jointly estimating equations
(10) and (11) via maximum likelihood; endogenous variables are treated as linear functions of
their instruments as well as other exogenous variables. Standard error are corrected for the
correlation induced by the fact that individuals are observed over multiple periods.
INSERT TABLE 6 "IV Estimation of network e¤ects on schooling enrolment" HERE
Results are displayed in table 6. The models in column 1 to 3 are three di¤erent specications
of the Amemiya-Newey instrumental variable probit model, where the instruments used are
enrolment in the military, rain intensity and return episodes. In the second column, we control for
village xed e¤ects, while in the third we add, as an additional group level regressor, the average
level of education of the networks population. In all the three specications, network size enters
as a negative and signicant determinant of schooling enrolment: there is thus support for the
hypothesis that young individuals, when migrating, have a lower propensity to acquire an higher
level of education if they are part of a large enclave. The magnitude of the impact becomes
21The exogeneity of this second instrument can be challenged: if shocks at the origin alter demands of staying
villagers for support by their family migrants, then the need to remit more can explain a change in labour supply
of the young.
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higher when network size is instrumented, a one standard deviation change in network size
corrisponding to a decrease in the probability of enrollment of 6.6% (for specication in column
2). It is interesting to observe that the size of the e¤ect increases when using instruments, as
we suspected given that unobservable preferences for social interactions with ones origin group
can magnify the externality and a measurement error in the network size could attenuate the
non-IV estimates.
Regarding the instrumental variables, the lagged number of drafted soldiers is strongly cor-
related with the size of the network in all the specications. Rain intensity, as expected, reduces
out-migration from the village, even if its statistical signicance is reduced when we add village
xed e¤ects to the model specication. The number of episodes of return at period t  1 are an
highly signicant and positive predictor of the stock of migrants at any destination at period t.
Column 5 of table 6 is an attempt of estimating network e¤ects on schooling choice making
a simultaneous use of instrumental variables and of the Heckman type correction for selection
into migration. This is done by simply adding, as an extra regressor in the IV model, the
inverse Mills ratio term  obtained from the migration choice equation 22. The selection term
is statistically signicant, and the instrumented network size e¤ect shows no sizable variation.
Of course, the validity of the conclusions on the relevance of network e¤ects depends on the
validity of the model on which the IV estimates are based. A test of overidentifying restrictions
needs to be undertaken in order to check the reliability of the identication strategy. Lung-Fei
(1992) shows that the minimized distance for these estimators provides a test of overidentifying
restrictions: the null of instrument exogeneity can not be rejected 23.
4.3 Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
It is possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity exploiting the availability of repeated
observations for each individual. Given that we dispose of data on both migrants and non
migrants, a convenient way of extending the previous discussion to a panel data setting is to
redene the model as a multinomial one for the four possible status j, dened by the interaction
of residential status (migrate to an urban destination or stay in Nang Rong) and enrollment




22 It must be noted that this methodology is problematic as it requires a two-stage solution of the selection
model instead of the full maximum likelihood approach: the two-stage estimation is biased when the outcome
variable is binary, as in our case. (see STATA (2007)).
23The Lee (1992) test statistic is distributed as Chi-squared with (L-K) degrees of freedom under the null that
the instruments are valid. The value of the statistic for the model with village xed e¤ects is 3.766, to which it
corresponds a P-value of 0.1521.
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4. Stay, Work
The fourth option (Stay and Work) is used as the reference category.
In this way, we are able to endogenize the location of residence decision with decisions in
each period about going to school, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals.
I restrict the focus to a particularly convenient class of multinomial models, the mixed logit
or logit Kernel model (Ben-Akiva et al. (2001), Prowse (2005)). In this setting, individual i
rationally chooses one of the four options j to maximize his payo¤ V in each period t:
Vi;1;t = 
0Xi1t + 0Neti1t 1 + i;1 + i;1;t (14)
Vi;2;t = 
0Xi2t + 0Neti2t 1 + i;2 + i;2;t
Vi;3;t = 
0Xi2t + 0Neti2t 1 + i;3 + i;3;t
Vi;4;t = i;4;t
Where X is the vector of controls, Nt 1 is the network variable and the fourth option Vi;4;t
(Stay in Nang Rong and Work) is chosen as the reference category, according to which the
parameters  and  in the rst three equations are interpretable.
Individual i chooses alternative j at time t with the following probability:
Pi;j;t = P (
0Xi1t + 0Neti1t 1 + i;j + i;j;t) > max
k=1;::;4;k 6=j





The joint probability of the individuals observed sequence of choices is obtained by inte-







exp(0Xi1t + 0Neti1t 1 + i;j)P
k=1;:;J exp(
0Xi1t + 0Neti1t 1 + i;j)
!Yi;j;t
dF (i) (16)
Estimation is performed by maximum simulated likelihood. In order to understand the
intuition behind this method, observe that the unconditional log-likelihood can be interpreted





24 exp(0Xi1t + 0Neti1t 1 + i;j)P
k=1;::J exp(
0Xi1t + 0Neti1t 1 + i;j)
!Yi;j35
Simulation methods proceed by sampling R times from the distribution of i and constructing
Pi(
r
i ) for r = 1::::R: The individual simulated likelihood are simply obtained by averaging Pi(
r
i )
over the R draws from the distribution of i: By the SLLN, simulated maximum likelihood
estimates converge almost surely to the true parameters as R!1 and N !1:
A variety of simulation methods exist for sampling from the distribution of i; we here use
Halton draws, which have been shown to provide an high level of accuracy for a relatively low
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computational time (Train (2000)) 24. Results are displayed in table 7.
INSERT TABLE 7 "Mixed Logit estimation of Network e¤ects" HERE
While no straightforward comparison is possible with previous models, new interesting in-
sights emerge. The estimation is performed on the whole sample of migrants and non migrants,
so to circumvent the problem of selection in migration choice. The rst three columns (1) refer to
a multinomial model with random intercepts, all the other variables having their co¢ cients kept
xed. The three columns on the right (2) refer to a second specication of the model with time
invariant random intercepts and time invariant random coe¢ cients for the network variables,
all the other variables having xed coe¢ cients. The two specications both allow correlations
and/or heteroscedasticity in the within period and between period unobservables a¤ecting the
individuals payo¤s from each of the alternatives.
Coe¢ cients need to be interpreted with respect to the baseline alternative, staying in Nang
Rong as a worker. For example, looking at the coe¢ cients for family wealth (proxied by the
asset score), one can see that those studying after the age of 13 come from relatively wealthier
families; those migrating to internal destinations for working have a less wealthy background
with respect to those who stay and nd an employment in their origin region.
Concerning the network e¤ect, there is evidence of a signicant impact of the migrant network
size on preferences for employment or education of those leaving their village. The young with
a larger network tend to migrate and start working more at destination, while they exhibit a
lower preference for moving and studying in the city. We can consider a discrete change in the
network size to have an intuition on the magnitude of this e¤ect: one standard deviation in
the size of the network (an increase of 33,3 individuals present at destination) tends to increase
the probability of choosing the option of migrating and working by 9,7%, while decreasing the
probability of choosing to migrate and study by 15,5%, when these two options are evaluated
with respect to the baseline choice of staying in the origin village to work.25
4.4 Robustness checks
In order to test the robustness of the results, we start by exploring whether the signicance of
our regressor of interest is a¤ected by di¤erent specication of the selection and instrumental
variable models. Enriching the models with other covariates which are at the group level and
time varying is a reasonable way to inspect the sensitiveness of the estimated network size e¤ect
to di¤erent model specications: we have thus tried to reestimate the models adding the mean
education level of the network population as an additional regressor. As it can be seen in column
3 of table 5 for the selection model and in column 3 of table 6 for the instrumental variable model,
24The model is estimated on STATA using the mixlogit routine developed by Hole (2007). Another convenient
estimator of the model is by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Similarities between the two methods are
carefully explained by Train (2003). .
25This calculation is based on estimates from specication 1. There is a signicant e¤ect of network size on the
choice of studying rather than working while staying in Nang Rong; however, this estimated e¤ect is very small
(one standard deviation change in network size a¤ecting the relative probability of studying at origin by 0,6%).
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the network size estimate is robust when controlling for this additional group characteristic.
One potential drawback to the application of the Heckman selection model is its sensitivity
to the assumed parametric distribution of the unobservable error terms in the model. If the
joint distribution of the error terms in equations (1) and (2) is misspecied, the second-step
parameter estimator will be inconsistent in general. Newey et al. (1990) conditions on a polyno-
mial of the estimated probability of participation in a regression framework, in order to avoid to
impose parametric forms on error distributions. This exible function of the estimated probabil-
ity approximates the unknown conditional expectation of the error term, just as the Mills ratio
terms, which are functions of the probability of participation, represent the conditional expecta-
tion of the unobservable under the normality assumption. In column 4 of table 5, the selection
model is semi-parametrically estimated in two steps as suggested by Newey et al. (1990), using
a quartic in the predicted probability of migration to approximate the true control function26:
the coe¢ cient on the network size decreases in size, while its statistical signicance is not much
altered27.
Angrist (2001) argues that the common use of parametric models overly complicates inference
when the statistic of interest is causal e¤ects and suggests that linear approximation like standard
2SLS performs as well as parametric estimators in a labor-supply model.28 In column 4 of
table 5, we thus provide two stage least square estimates as an alternative to the instrumental
variable probit model. The linear approximation yields results that are similar to the probit
ones, conrming that the signicance of network e¤ect seems robust to alternative parametric
assumptions.
INSERT TABLE 8 "Additional Robustness Checks for Selection Model" and TABLE 9
"Additional Robustness Checks for IV Model" HERE.
Other robustness checks performed on the two models are presented in table 7 and table
8. In column 2 of table 7, the selection model is re-estimated on a smaller sample, limiting
the observation to the life histories of young individuals between the ages of 13 and 20. Again,
the network size e¤ect is stable. In the third column of table 7 and in column 2 of table 8,
migrants to the regional capital of Buriram are excluded from the sample: those migrating to
this city might face a di¤erent assimilation process, given closeness and lower ethnical diversity
of this destination with respect to Nang Rong villages. In both models, the estimates of network
e¤ects seems only marginally a¤ected by this change in the relevant sample. Finally, in column
26As stressed by Newey et al. (1990), this and other variants of semi-parametric estimators of the selection model
would require some mechanism to choose the amount of "smoothing" imposed (here number of basis functions).
We are not aware of any "rule of thumb" providing clear guidance on the lenght of the polynomial, and the quartic
function has been simply chosen after testing for signicance of alternative control functions.
27Results of the semi-parametric estimation of the selection model are only provided as a robustness check, since
the two-step estimation of binary response models is problematic: the likelihood in the second step is biased, and
the extent of the bias is proportional to the size of the correlation between the error terms of the two equations.
28Mo¢ tt (2001) renes the conclusion of Angrist by arguing that the good performance of 2SLS depends
crucially on where in the sample we look for causal e¤ects. Due to the constant e¤ect assumption of 2SLS, 2SLS
and probit are bound to give di¤erent answers if we do not consider average e¤ects or if we consider individuals
with extreme characteristics, i.e. where the tted value is not near zero.See Arendt & Holm (2007).
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3 of table 8, we check whether the instrumental variable model results are sensitive to the
choice of a specic set of instrument. The model is re-estimated with a weaker rst stage
regression, including only the military draft as instrumental variable. Statistically signicance
of the network size does not seem to be largely a¤ected.
5 Conclusions
Economic integration and modernization benet to a di¤erent extent individuals who are born
in di¤erent regions: in developing countries, divides between enlocked rural regions and dynamic
urban poles have tended to widen in the last decades, and so location of birth persists to be an
important predictor of economic opportunities. Di¤erent economic models have illustrated how
this opportunity gap is destined to shrink when mobility is not constrained by high migration
costs. However, this is clearly true only if labor markets at destination do not segmentate in
niches separating migrants from native, and if migrants are perceived and behave at destination
labor market as the natives do. What we observe in reality is that migrants tend to concentrate
in enclaves at destination, and networks as informal institutions have an important role in
smoothing assimilation to urban life, either by promoting solidarity and risk sharing among
their members, either by easing employment matching. In this paper, we looked at the dynamic
implications of the strong ties linking young migrants to their own community of origin: if
networks channel career choices so that individuals fail to take full advantage of the economic
opportunities o¤ered by the city, can we suspect dynamic ine¢ ciencies and low upward mobility
to arise as a consequence of networking?
We observe an high reliance on community support by Thai internal migrants; the data
also show a very low propensity of young migrants to invest in acquiring higher education.
Assuming that higher and technical education is needed for talented individuals to reap the
full opportunities of booming cities, we have argued that a simple test of network e¤ects on
economic mobility can be undertaken by regressing network size (as a proxy for density of the
community ties and for the probability that networks are active and e¤ective) on the probability
of the young to be enrolled as student at destination. In practice, empirical analysis of network
e¤ects is challenging, as potential selection and simultaneity bias need to be accounted for.
We have proposed three di¤erent estimation frameworks in order to check the consistency of
results, exploiting the uniqueness of a dataset which accurately describes migration and career
choices of both stayers and movers29. We have rst addressed the issue of selectivity of the
migrants sample for which network e¤ects are estimated, aggregating information on migrants
and non migrants in order to correct for the non-random allocation of young people growing in
a setting with dense migration history. Secondly, we have used instrumental variable estimation
29 It is useful to repeat here that individuals are not dened as movers or stayers once and for all. Disposing of
life history data, we can treat an individual as a migrant at a particular age if he is observed residing out of the
village for most of the time at that particular age. Thus many individuals contribute to both the migrant sample
and the non migrant sample at di¤erent periods of their observed life span (13 to 25 years old).
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as an attempt to verify that the negative correlation between network size and young schooling
choice is not spouriously determined by unobservable characteristics or shocks a¤ecting either
village migration and human capital accumulation at destination. Finally, we remarked that
unobserved preferences matter in explaining migration behaviour and in determining perceived
opportunity costs of higher schooling; exploiting the availability of repeated choices for migrants
and non migrants, we have modelled the simultaneous schooling and migration decision using
a multinomial mixed logit formulation which allows a straightforward accounting of individual
heterogeneity.
The three models suggest that a statistically signicant negative relation links young mi-
grants schooling decision with the size of the network of co-villagers present at destination.
Even if the negative network externality is small in this sample, the paper provides evidence of
a channel which can lead to persistence of low educational attainment for those born in rural
areas. This nding has important implications for policies attempting to rise schooling partici-
pation: if the story presented in this paper is correct, young migrants integrated in su¢ ciently
large enclaves perceive an higher opportunity cost of schooling and tend to join the labor force
earlier. Since migrant networks are not likely to lose importance as rural urban integration pro-
ceeds, there is the need to study better why the clustering in solidal networks might undermine
investment in education at destination.
Two main explanations should be considered. A rst possible explanation link the migrant
network size with the development of asymmetric or stratied communities within the city.
Given an initial disadvantage with respect to natives, young migrants end up living in less
dynamic neighborhood. Labor market institutions specic to these heterogenous communities
- and in particular the word-of-mouth mode of dissemination of information about scarse job
opportunities - also play a role, as individuals embedded in low skill networks develop lower
expected returns to high education acquisition (Anderberg & Andersson (2007)). According to
the second explanation, the community e¤ectively discourages the acquisition of higher education
by their members, as this behaviour is perceived as a deviation and sanctioned.
A social planner interested in raising educational achievements of the young migrants should
sensibly think about measures a¤ecting the community evaluation of higher schooling, such as
reserving a preferential access of migrants to training and matching programs granting access
to remurative, high skill jobs. It might also be worth experimenting policy measures reducing
the dependency of young individuals on support of their own origin community (for example,
scholarship schemes involving the phisical deplacement of the young to neighborhoods where
concentration of their co-villagers is lower30).
What is valid for internal migration is potentially even more valid for international migra-
tion: consider that as the cost of migration and assimilation rise, so the value attached by the
30Evaluations of the Moving to Opportunity Program (for example Kling et al. (2005)), show signicant im-
provement in young outcomes. In these programs, randomly selected families in disadvantaged neighborhoods
receive a nancial transfer to move to more a­ uent areas.
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individual to partecipation in his community group rises.
Finally, further research is warranted to extend the analysis of migrant network e¤ects on
dimensions of upward mobility other than schooling, such as the relative participation of those
with a migratory history to non traditional employment sectors.
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6 Appendix
We here provide the proof for proposition 1 of section 2, following closely the original model of
Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008). Proposition 1 says that an initial inequality in the allocation of
skills between groups can not be reversed in equilibrium. The proof is based on the denition of
competitive equilibrium as an allocation of skill across groups satisfying equations (1)-(4), and
the result follows from the assumed complementarity of low and high skill labor in the process of
production. Assume that the proportion of skilled in two groups at the initial period is given by
(sN0 ; s
M
0 ) 2 [0; 1]2: Then, by equations (1) and (2), the proportion of skilled in the initial period
in the overall economy, so; and in each group network, (LN0 ; L
M
0 ) 2 [0; 1]2; are uniquely dened.
Dene the function ' as follows:
'(s) = n(1 G(eat+1((st+1); LNt ))) + (1  n)(1 G(eat+1((st+1); LMt ))): (17)
Note that '(s) is bounded between 0 and 1, and strictly decreasing, as '(0) = 1 and '(1) = 0:
Then, given (LN0 ; L
M
0 ); there exists a unique value of s such that s='(s):From equation (1) and
equation (4), s1 must satisfy s1 = '(s1) in equilibrium, so s1 is uniquely dened. This extends
logically to the pair (sN1 ; s
M
1 ); which is also uniquely dened from (4). Having proven uniqueness,
an initial situation of inequality sN0 > s
M
0 will persist at any t given the construction of L
V in
(2), the dynamics in (4) and the fact that the threshold ea is decreasing in network quality LV :
This completes the proof for proposition 1.
Is this conclusion valid asymptotically? In other words, we wonder whether convergence can
be achieved as t!1 given an initial condition of disequality. Dene a competitive equilibrium
as a steady state if (sN0 ; s
M




t ) for all t. Steady states are symmetric if the two groups
have a common skill share, sNt = s
M
t At any symmetric steady state, the common skill share
stmust solve
s = 1 G(ea((s); s)) (18)
Since costs of training are bounded and benets goes to innite as s ! 0; everyone gets
trained when s! 0;i.e. lims!0(s) = 0: Samely, lims!0(s) = 0; as (1) = 0:
Thus, there must exist at least one symmetric steady state. There will be only one symmetric
steady state if ea((s); s) is strictly increasing in s at any such state, or
dea
ds
= ea10 + ea2 > 0 (19)
where ea1 and ea2 are partial derivatives. The condition simply says that as s rises, the
threshold raises too as the wage gap shrinks: this must be the case if the reduction in cost due
to the externality is not high enough to compensate the e¤ect of a reduction in the benet of
training (the wage gap) as s rises. Is this unique steady state stable? This depends on the level
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fV = 1 G(ea((nfN + (1  n)fM )); sVt 1 + (1  )(nsNt 1 + (1  n)sMt 1)) (21)
Assume that the externality e¤ect is not too small:
G0 jea2j > 1 (22)










By some manipulations from (21), Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008) show that these eigenval-
ues are equal to:
1 =  G0ea2; (24)
2 =  G0ea2(1  )
where  = G
0(ea10)
1+G0(ea10) :
Both eigenvalues are positive and 2 < 1 for all parameter values. Thus the steady state is
asymptotically stable if 1 < 1 and unstable if 1 > 1: From assumption (22), it follows that
there is a level of segregation b 2 (0; 1); such that the unique symmetric steady state is unstable















Table 1. List of variables  
Variable Description 
                                                      Dependent variables 
Student  1=Enrolled as student, 0= Not Enrolled  
Migrant 1=Living in a urban destination, 0= Living in a Nang Rong Village 
  
                  Main explanatory variables  
Network Size Number of year/destination/village specific established migrants, in multiples of ten. In all 
regressions it is computed with one year lag. For each young, migrants from his own 
family are excluded from the count 
Total Network  Number of year/village specific established migrants, in multiples of ten.  In all regressions 
it is computed with one year lag. For each  young, migrants from his own family are 
excluded from the count 
Family Migration Family average of adult – 30 year-old of older - individual migration histories (years spent 
outside Nang Rong/years of adult life(14 years old or more)) 
Network’s education Destination/village specific average of years of education completed by established 
migrants. Computed with one year lag.   
     
                Instrumental variables  
Military Number of drafted soldiers who left the village, inserted in all regressions with two years 
lag 
Rain volume  Year average of monthly measures (in ml) of rain fallen in Nang Rong, interacted with 
averages (at village or household levels) of labor supply in agriculture (years spent 
working in agriculture /years of adult life (14 years old or more)). 
Return  Number of Individuals returning to the village from one urban destination, inserted in all 
regressions with two years lag.  
 
 
                 
                Main control variables  
Actual age  Age of the young at each period of the panel 
Age in 2000 Age of the young when interviewed for the 2000 survey 
Buriram 0= young lives in Buriram province, 1=young does not live in Buriram province 
Eastern Seaboard 0= young lives in Rayong or Chanbury, 1=young does not live in  Rayong or Chanbury  
Khorat 0= young lives in Khorat, 1=young does not live in  Khorat 
Language 0= more than one language is spoken at home, 1= only one language is spoken at home 
Male 0=female, 1=male 
Other destination 0= young does not live in any Thai destination other than Bangkok, Khorat, Eastern 
Seaboard or Buriram at a given age; 1=young lives in another destination  
Parental education Average years of formal education completed by the parents. Years of education 
completed by the father (the mother), if only information on the father (the mother) is 
available 
Road length Distance in kilometres of the origin village from the main road to the town of Nang Rong 
Siblings Number of living younger brothers and sisters 
School 1 = there is a secondary school in origin village, built in 1980 or earlier; 0= there is no 
such school in origin village 
Single 0= married; 1= not married 
Asset score  Principal component wealth score obtained by using 1984 data on origin family’s 
ownership of the following assets:   television,  recorder,  telephone, refrigerator, 
computer, washing machine, motorcycle, car and  truck,  extension of plots cultivated. 
  
                 Other descriptive variables 
Salary Deflated migrant’s hourly wages (in bath) at first migration 
Support 1= migrant received help to find a job or to set up an entrepreneurial activity by family or 
friends, at his first migration; 0= migrant did not receive this help 
Education completed Years of formal schooling completed 
Family at destination 1= migrant has family members present at destination at the time of his first migration, 
0=no family members present 
Money received Money (in bath) received from origin family during the first migration year 
Money sent Money (in bath) sent to the family in the village during the first migration year 
Others came 1 = migrant moved with others at his first migration, 2=migrant moved alone 
Others living 1 =migrant lived with family or friends at first migration, 0= migrant lived with no family or 
friends at his first migration 
Job in 1 month 1 = migrant found a job within 1 month at first migration, 0=migrant did not find a job in 1 
month  
Education completed Years of formal schooling completed 
Neighbours from Isan Percentage of neighbour coming from Isan for migrants in 2000. First refers to first 
migration and now to the year 2000  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
 
  Nang Rong All migrants Bangkok Khorat East seabord Buriram Others
Age in 2000 mean 25.62 26.21 25.97 27.71 24.88 26.78 26.42
     sd 5.21 4.55 4.30 5.71 4.58 5.32 4.54
Male mean 0.54 0.49 0.47 0.60 0.52 0.52 0.47
     sd 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
Single mean 0.40 0.35 0.41 0.38 0.46 0.30 0.29
     sd 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.45
Parental Education mean 8.79 8.88 8.80 9.18 8.92 9.74 8.75
     sd 4.03 4.05 3.88 4.02 3.98 5.31 3.78
Education completed mean 6.33 6.39 5.79 6.67 5.13 8.48 7.02
     sd 3.37 3.72 3.29 3.74 2.59 4.01 4.23
Asset Score mean 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.09
     sd 1.34 1.44 1.31 1.39 1.43 1.93 1.44
Siblings mean 0.12 1.08 1.09 0.86 1.47 1.01 1.07
     sd 0.67 2.06 2.14 1.95 2.29 1.80 1.98
Road Length mean 5.65 5.27 5.47 5.58 5.79 5.58 4.95
     sd 3.30 3.11 3.23 3.08 3.21 3.10 2.96
Network mean  48.39 63.31 5.86 11.86 34.13 48.51
     sd  30.83 30.22 3.78 10.17 19.46 25.47
Family at destination mean  1.36 1.32 0.54 1.08 0.83 1.26
     sd  1.06 1.13 0.73 1.05 0.86 1.14
Return mean  4.51 5.29 3.22 2.82 3.49 4.65
     sd  7.16 7.60 6.42 5.78 6.94 7.00
Salary mean  12.53 12.07 13.94 14.12 12.95 11.96
     sd  12.53 11.91 8.20 9.49 10.17 14.48
Money received mean  3.88 3.29 3.44 4.09 4.45 4.22
     sd  1.89 1.59 2.40 1.74 2.02 1.99
Money sent mean  4.54 4.62 4.56 4.51 4.87 4.17
     sd  1.47 1.41 1.67 1.66 1.40 1.55
Others came mean  0.62 0.64 0.69 0.60 0.54 0.61
     sd  0.48 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.49
Others living mean  0.73 0.75 0.68 0.68 0.60 0.76
     sd  0.45 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.43
Support mean  0.61 0.67 0.60 0.56 0.34 0.66
     sd  0.49 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.47
Job in 1 month mean  0.88 0.88 0.69 0.88 0.93 0.76
 sd  0.33 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.25 0.43
Isan Neighbours first  mean  62.17 60.78 64.72 70.97 54.54 63.61
 sd  30.46 31.16 26.19 28.65 31.42 29.28
Isan Neighbours now mean  60.33 60.05 64.71 56.69 58.72 60.84
 sd  31.73 31.92 32.00 34.14 30.62 31.34
Isan friends now mean  67.36 66.83 63.18 65.17 63.61 67.44
 sd  39.48 40.12 41.69 38.15 42.14 38.66














Table 3. Validating the network measure 
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
Note: Estimated on Nang Rong Project 2000 data for migrant sample.  
Dependent variable: Ask someone from same village if experience money 
problems 
 Probit  
  
Network size 0.11a 
 [0.02] 






Education completed 0.001 
 [0.02] 
Siblings  0.04 
 [0.03] 




Others came -0.17 
 [0.12] 
Others living 0.43a 
 [0.15] 
Owns a car 1.30c 
 [0.75] 




































Table 4. Transition Matrix for joint mobility and study choices (13-25 years old / all cohorts) 
 
  Stay and Work 
 
Stay and Study Migrate and Work Migrate and Study 


































Note: Author’s calculations on sample extracted from Nang Rong life history data for 2000; the numbers on 
the diagonal indicate the cases of no changes in status from one year to the following in the panel. Outside 
the diagonal are the cases of transitions from the state indicated in the first column at one year, to the state 
indicated in the first line at the following year (for example, in our sample there have been 414 cases of 
transitions from the state of residence in Nang Rong as a student (Stay and Study) to the state of residence 






























 (2)  
Probit with selection 
 (3)   
Semi-parametric 
 (4) 
Dependent  Variable student migrant student migrant student migrant  student 
Network Size -0.05a  -0.04b  -0.04c   -0.04c 
  [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.02]   [0.02] 
Network’s education     0.01 -0.02a   
      [0.01] [0.01]   
Total network  1.16a  1.92a  0.62a   
   [0.12]  [0.15]  [0.15]   
Family migration  0.75a  0.73a  0.79a   
   [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14]   
Rain volume (family)  -0.97a  -0.97a  -1.00a   
   [0.19]  [0.20]  [0.20]   
Age in 2000 0.02 -0.06c 0.03 -0.07c 0.02 -0.07c  0.03 
  [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.04]  [0.09] 
Male -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06  -0.03 
  [0.11] [0.05] [0.11] [0.05] [0.11] [0.05]  [0.12] 
Single 0.66a -0.15a 0.67a -0.16a 0.62a -0.16a  0.71a 
  [0.12] [0.06] [0.12] [0.06] [0.12] [0.06]  [0.13] 
Parental education 0.12a 0.01 0.11a 0.01 0.12a 0.01  0.12a 
  [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]  [0.02] 
Siblings 0.003 0.15a 0.003 0.15a 0.01 0.15a  0.06 
  [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]  [0.06] 
Language 0.13 0.23a 0.12 0.17a 0.12 0.17a  0.13 
  [0.15] [0.06] [0.15] [0.06] [0.15] [0.06]  [0.17] 
Asset score 0.17a -0.06a 0.16a -0.05a 0.17a -0.05a  0.18a 
  [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]  [0.04] 
Road length  -0.03a    -0.03a  0.2 
   [0.01]    [0.01]  [0.36] 
School 0.23 -0.09 0.22 -0.06 0.22 -0.06  -0.04 
  [0.15] [0.07] [0.33] [0.14] [0.33] [0.14]  [0.14] 
Korat 0.46b  0.52b  0.52b   0.62b 
  [0.23]  [0.23]  [0.22]   [0.24] 
Eastern Seabord -0.47b  -0.41c  -0.44c   -0.48c 
  [0.21]  [0.23]  [0.21]   [0.26] 
Buriram 0.81a  0.82a  0.85a   0.94a 
  [0.18]  [0.17]  [0.17]   [0.16] 
Other destination 0.1  0.12  0.11   0.15 
  [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14]   [0.15] 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No  Yes 
Constant -2.59 1.22 -2.78 0.96 -2.6 0.97  1.72 
  [2.59] [1.39] [2.50] [1.45] [2.48] [1.37]  [1.59] 
Observations 5624 12438 5624 12438 5317 11783 5366 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -8467.88 -8119.854  -8344.54 -840.58 
 
Robust standard errors in bracket, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
Note: Semi-parametric in column 4 refers to the estimation method suggested in Newey et al.(1990), and use a qaurtic
In the predicted probability of migration estimated as a first stage.  
 
 
Table 6. IV Estimation of network effects on schooling enrolment 
 
 
 IV Probit  IV Probit IV Probit  2SLS  IV Probit 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable student network  student network student network  student  student network
Network size -0.09c   -0.19a  -0.22a   -0.02b  -0.19a  
  [0.05]   [0.06]  [0.07]   [0.01]  [0.07]  
Network's education       -0.03 -0.12a      
       [0.02] [0.03]      
Military  0.31a   0.13a  0.11a     0.13a 
   [0.04]   [0.04]  [0.04]     [0.04] 
Rain volume (village) -3.71a   -1.52c  -1.57c     -0.59  
   [1.20]   [0.94]  [0.90]     [1.06] 
Return  0.12a   0.08a  0.07a     0.08a 
   [0.01]   [0.01]  [0.01]     [0.01] 
Selection (IMR)         -1.94a  -1.38b  
            [0.60] [0.56] 
Age in 2000 0.001 -0.06  -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06  0.001  0.09 0.12c 
  [0.07] [0.06]  [0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06]  [0.01]  [0.08] [0.07] 
Male -0.07 0.14  0.1 -0.05 0.14 -0.04  -0.01  0.0002 0.14 
  [0.14] [0.16]  [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.12]  [0.02]  [0.14] [0.13] 
Single -0.13 0.68a  -0.12 0.75a -0.14 0.73a  0.09a  0.89a -0.01 
  [0.14] [0.18]  [0.14] [0.13] [0.13] [0.13]  [0.02]  [0.14] [0.15] 
Parental education 0.17a 0.004  0.17a 0.01 0.17a 0.001  0.03a  0.16a 0.002 
  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]  [0.00]  [0.03] [0.02] 
Siblings 0.03 0.01  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01  0.004  -0.10b -0.07c 
  [0.02] [0.03]  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]  [0.003]  [0.05] [0.04] 
Language -0.04 0.22  -0.26 -0.15 -0.24 -0.15  -0.04  -0.38c -0.41b 
  [0.18] [0.21]  [0.19] [0.19] [0.19] [0.19]  [0.02]  [0.21] [0.20] 
Asset score 0.19a -0.05  0.17a -0.14b 0.17a -0.10c  0.04a  0.22a -0.10c 
  [0.05] [0.07]  [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06]  [0.01]  [0.05] [0.06] 
School -0.04 -0.21  -0.29 -0.08 -0.1 -0.34  0.003  -0.1 -0.32 
  [0.19] [0.28]  [0.56] [0.40] [0.40] [0.55]  [0.07]  [0.40] [0.56] 
Khorat 0.32 -5.91a  -0.14 -5.59a -5.25a -0.27  0.04  -0.13 -5.55a 
  [0.37] [0.18]  [0.29] [0.45] [0.49] [0.29]  [0.08]  [0.46] [0.29] 
Eastern Seaboard -0.49 -4.36a  -0.85b -3.99a -0.97b -3.89a  -0.10b  -0.89b -4.00a 
  [0.32] [0.21]  [0.37] [0.23] [0.39] [0.20]  [0.05]  [0.38] [0.22] 
Buriram 0.07 -1.54a  -0.06 -1.43a -1.52a -0.13  0.004  -0.05 -1.43a 
  [0.18] [0.21]  [0.18] [0.15] [0.15] [0.19]  [0.02]  [0.19] [0.15] 
Other destination 0.92a -3.16a  -2.86a 0.70b -3.02a 0.54c  0.21a  0.67b -2.87a 
  [0.24] [0.25]  [0.27] [0.28] [0.33] [0.27]  [0.05]  [0.29] [0.28] 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Age fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant -2.20 6.63a  -2.13 4.26 3.95 -2.05  0.04  2.86 3.45 
 [2.80] [2.52]  [0.14] [2.45] [2.69] [0.02]  [0.36]  [3.05] [2.39] 
Pseudo Loglikelihood -6791.00  -5979.58 -6673.57     -5947.49
Adjusted R squared                                                                                                                           0.34 
Robust standard errors in bracket, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level  
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
Note: The estimation method is in all regression except column (4) is the Newey (1987) Amemiya (1978) 









 Table 7. Mixed Logit estimation of Network effects 
 Mixed logit by MSL  Mixed logit by MSL 














Network Size -0.03a -0.02a 0.01a  -0.02a -0.01a 0.01a 
  [0.003] [0.002] [0.001]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] 
Age in 2000 0.61a -0.48a 0.31a  0.91a -0.06a 0.30a 
  [0.18] [0.15] [0.06]  [0.19] [0.15] [2.02] 
Actual Age -0.79 1.96a 1.29a  -0.83 1.169a 1.14a 
  [0.49] [0.36] [0.13]  [0.45] [0.37] [0.12] 
Actual Age squared -0.04a -0.05a -0.04a  -0.05a -0.04a -0.03a 
  [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]  [0.01] [0.01] [0.002] 
Male -0.29 -0.38 -0.37b  0.038 -0.781 -0.45b 
  [0.35] [0.28] [0.17]  [0.38] [0.33] [0.18] 
Parental education 0.75a 0.10a 0.60a  0.91a 0.22a 0.87a 
  [0.05] [0.02] [0.05]  [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] 
Siblings 0.60a 0.67a 0.46a  0.84a 0.68a 0.82a 
  [0.07] [0.04] [0.08]  [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] 
Asset score 0.12 0.41a -0.30a  0.14a 0.30a   
  [0.11] [0.08] [0.06]  [0.09] [0.08] [0.33a] 
School 1.08c 0.64c 0.16  1.03c 0.64c -0.1 
  [0.61] [0.35] [0.22]  [0.37] [0.38] [0.23] 
Road Lenght 0.05 -0.09a 0.19a  -0.05 -0.14a -0.05a 
  [0.06] [0.03] [0.05]  [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] 
Village dev. score 0.29b -0.30a 0.15a  0.12b 0.20a 0.15a 
  [0.12] [0.09] [0.06]  [0.1] [0.09] [0.05] 
  -21.84a -25.71° -10.19b  31.04 24.08 -17.85a 
  [5.94] [2.04] [4.82]  [6.4] [2.12] [4.74] 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 47504    47504    
Standard errors in brackets, c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a  significant at 1% 































  Probit with selection  Probit with selection 
    
(1) 
Only 13-20 years old   
(2) 
Migrants to Buriram dropped 
   student migrant  student migrant 
Network Size -0.05b   -0.06b   
   [0.02]   [0.02]   
Total network  1.97a   1.87a 
    [0.19]   [0.15] 
Family migration  0.88a   0.71a 
    [0.20]   [0.15] 
Rain volume   -1.17a   -0.94a 
    [0.25]   [0.20] 
Age in 2000  0.01 -0.01  0.04 -0.06 
   [0.07] [0.04]  [0.08] [0.04] 
Male  -0.02 -0.11c  -0.14 -0.07 
   [0.13] [0.06]  [0.12] [0.05] 
Single  0.79a -0.23a  0.52a -0.13b 
   [0.14] [0.07]  [0.12] [0.06] 
Parental education 0.16a -0.01  0.11a 0.01 
   [0.03] [0.01]  [0.02] [0.01] 
Siblings  0.01 0.09a  0.01 0.15a 
   [0.03] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02] 
Language  -0.16 0.18b  0.11 0.19a 
   [0.18] [0.08]  [0.16] [0.07] 
Asset score  0.19a -0.05c  0.15a -0.08a 
   [0.05] [0.03]  [0.04] [0.02] 
School  -0.03 -0.11  0.25 -0.05 
   [0.37] [0.19]  [0.30] [0.15] 
Khorat  0.58b   0.44c   
   [0.27]   [0.23]   
Eastern Seaboard -0.3   -0.48b   
   [0.28]   [0.23]   
Other destination 0.12   0.06   
   [0.15]   [0.13]   
Buriram  0.99a      
   [0.21]      
Time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Age fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant  -2.25 -0.8  -3.31 0.23 
   [2.67] [1.42]  [2.95] [1.57] 
Observations  6984 6984  11795 11795 
Robust standard errors in brackets, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level 

















      
  IV Probit  IV Probit 
  
(1) Migrants to Buriram 
dropped  
(2) Military as unique 
instrument 
   student network  student network 
Network Size -0.19a   -0.46a   
  [0.07]   [0.07]   
Rain volume (village)  -1.01     
   [1.01]     
Return  0.08a     
   [0.01]     
Military  0.14a   0.07 
   [0.05]   [0.04] 
Age in 2000 0.04 0.002  0.04 0.02 
  [0.07] [0.06]  [0.05] [0.07] 
Male -0.23 0.07  0.01 0.09 
  [0.14] [0.12]  [0.13] [0.09] 
Single 0.60a -0.13  -0.06 0.35 
  [0.14] [0.13]  [0.14] [0.27] 
Parental education 0.17a 0.002  0.09 0.01 
  [0.03] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.06] 
Siblings 0.03 0.004  0.02 0.02 
  [0.03] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02] 
Language -0.15 -0.26  -0.17 -0.27 
  [0.21] [0.18]  [0.13] [0.20] 
Asset score 0.16a -0.13c  0.04 -0.13b 
  [0.05] [0.07]  [0.08] [0.06] 
School  -0.04 -0.51  -0.29 -0.14 
  [0.40] [0.59]  [0.31] [0.57] 
Khorat -0.15 -5.54a  -2.16a -5.64a 
  [0.51] [0.32]  [0.68] [0.28] 
Eastern Seaboard -0.93b -4.22a  -1.91a -4.00a 
  [0.41] [0.24]  [0.30] [0.23] 
Other destinations -0.11 -1.42a  -1.42a -0.56a 
  [0.18] [0.16]  [0.19] [0.16] 
Buriram    -0.71 -2.86a 
     [0.58] [0.29] 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Age fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant -3.81 6.46a  0.57 4.66c 
  [2.98] [2.33]  [2.19] [0.71] 
Observations  2225   2627   
      
Pseudo Loglikelihood -4560.7   -8378.4   
Robust standard errors in brackets, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
  
